Conducting four separate studies, this dissertation investigates the associations between chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) antecedents of accounting wrongdoing. First, Manuscript 1 employs five distinct machine learning algorithms on publicly listed firm years in the United States of America (U.S.) and provides evidence of the predictive value of isolated CEO characteristics and their combination with established raw financial items (FIN) on accounting wrongdoing. In particular, it demonstrates the importance of a CEO’s network size, age, and duality and suggests non-linear associations with accounting wrongdoing. Interestingly, the results imply that CEOs of a higher age who do not serve as chairman of the board and high network CEOs of high inventory firms show a larger likelihood of accounting wrongdoing. Second, Manuscript 2 systematically reviews 64 articles on CFOs’ accounting wrongdoing antecedents, discusses CEO and CFO similarities, and provides future research avenues. First and foremost, the study highlights that studies predominantly investigate CFO antecedents of isolated fraud dimensions, especially rationalization. Although CEO and CFO antecedents appear necessary for accounting wrongdoing, CFOs demonstrate more substantial incentives, similar opportunities, similar or stronger rationalization, and a slightly wider capacity for accounting wrongdoing than CEOs. Moreover, the type of accounting wrongdoing committed by CFOs and CEOs varies with context-related factors. Third, Manuscript 3 examines the associations among U.S. publicly listed CFOs’ individualism and uncertainty avoidance levels, derived from their country of origin, and their firms’ accounting wrongdoing likelihood. Interestingly, the study only suggests significantly negative associations between a CFO’s individualism and accounting wrongdoing. The CEO’s individualism seems to enhance this relationship. However, Manuscript 3 cannot find similar results for the CFO’s and CEO’s uncertainty avoidance dimension. Lastly, Manuscript 4 draws on publicly listed U.S. CFOs and CEOs and investigates their absolute power, the relative power gap, and distinct relative power constellations related to accounting wrongdoing. The results suggest that a CFO’s power is significantly positively associated with accounting wrongdoing, unlike the CEO’s power. Moreover, an increasing CEO-CFO power gap, a low power gap, and a high power gap are negatively, positively, and negatively related to accounting wrongdoing. These studies suggest that CEOs’ and CFOs’ backgrounds are essential antecedents for accounting wrongdoing. This necessitates future scholars to research both actors and their relationship to understand and detect accounting wrongdoing.